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INDIANA’S COLLATERAL SOURCE ACT:
CONFUSING COURTS AND UNDERMINING
THE SUBROGATION RIGHTS OF WORKER’S
COMPENSATION CARRIERS ONE
INTERPRETATION AT A TIME
I. INTRODUCTION
Worker’s compensation was developed during the height of the
Industrial Revolution to counteract the devastating effects from
frequently occurring workplace injuries, and to protect employers from
crippling civil judgments.1 Worker’s compensation benefits both injured
workers and employers by alleviating the tort system’s potential for a
financially devastating damages award.2 In doing so, the system
establishes a beneficial trade-off for employees and employers in the
event of an on-the-job injury, resulting in decreased litigation costs and
improved judicial efficiency.3
Every state requires all employees and employers to follow the
state’s specific worker’s compensation requirements.4 Since worker’s
compensation imposes limitations on recovery for injured employees,
states have allowed injured parties to pursue third-party actions for
other damages.5 To reduce double recovery risks and reimburse carriers,
all fifty states now provide carriers with subrogation rights.6 Essentially,
subrogation rights allow a worker’s compensation carrier who has
extended benefits to an injured employee to stand in the shoes of the
employee and be reimbursed by the negligent party for any incurred
costs.7 This stand-in method prevents double recovery by eliminating
See infra Part II.A (noting that before the advent of worker’s compensation, both the
employer and the employee were greatly harmed in the event of a workplace injury).
2
See infra Part II.A (discussing that a single civil judgment, even though rare, could
financially devastate an employer).
3
See infra Part II.A (discussing that the state legislatures wanted a benefits program that
was faster than Social Security or Medicare).
4
See infra Part II.A (demonstrating that worker’s compensation claims must be brought
before the Workmen’s Compensation Board, which is overseen by the state pursuant to
Indiana Code section 22-3-2-6); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-6 (West 2005) (discussing
the process and function of the Workmen’s Compensation Board in Indiana).
5
See infra Part II.B (explaining how subrogation allows carriers who supply worker’s
compensation benefits to injured parties to recoup those losses).
6
See infra Part II.B (explaining the statutes’ purpose is to prevent double recovery and
protect the carriers’ interests); see also infra notes 27, 31 (explaining the various state
subrogation statutes and the priorities they respectively give the interested parties in
worker’s compensation cases).
7
See infra Part II.B (discussing how subrogation operates to reimburse the employer or
carrier, whomever is the payer of the worker’s compensation benefits).
1

1139

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 4 [2012], Art. 6

1140 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

the risk that the jury’s award will include costs already received in
worker’s compensation benefits.8
The rise in health care costs and desire to abolish frivolous lawsuits
has triggered a recent tort reform movement, which has a dangerous
effect on the subrogation rights of carriers.9 In response to the
movement, states, like Indiana, have changed their collateral source
statutes through abrogation.10 Abrogation allows evidence of certain
third-party benefit payments to be introduced at trial.11 Collateral source
abrogation varies across the states and often influences subrogation
rights.12 The main purpose behind abrogation is to prevent meritless
lawsuits by eliminating the chance of double recovery by plaintiffs.13
Some states, like Indiana, have abrogated the collateral source rule for
worker’s compensation payments.14 However, the ambiguous language
in Indiana’s collateral source statute leaves award allocation and jury
intent extremely difficult to ascertain.15 The statute’s nebulous language
affords plaintiffs double recoveries, undermines the tort reform
movement’s purpose, and costs Indiana businesses millions in
unnecessary litigation expenses and damages.16
Part II of this Note details the history and development of worker’s
compensation law and subrogation rights for carriers.17 Part II also
explains the history of tort reform and its impact on the collateral source
rule.18 Next, Part III analyzes the present problems with the ambiguous
8
See infra Part II.B (clarifying how subrogation prevents double recovery); see also Parts
II.A.1, II.B.1 (explaining the courts’ interpretations of the various subrogation statutes and
noting the “strong policy against double recovery” (quoting Freel v. Foster Forbes Glass
Co., 449 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)).
9
See infra Part II.D (noting that the development of tort reform was to address frivolous
lawsuits for medical malpractice).
10
See infra Part II.D (explaining the various state approaches to abrogating their
collateral source statutes and the purposes for such abrogation).
11
See infra Part II.D (discussing the onslaught of abrogation across the nation and the
different approaches taken by the various states).
12
See infra Part II.D (explaining how there is no consistency across the states in the
abrogation of collateral source statutes).
13
See infra Part II.B (explaining that the chance of double recovery can entice plaintiffs to
file frivolous lawsuits to receive money that would not otherwise be owed to them).
14
See infra Part II.D (detailing the states’ various approaches to abrogation).
15
See infra Part III.B (explaining that the ambiguous language in the collateral source
statute undermines the purpose of subrogation).
16
See infra Part III (explaining that the interpretations the courts are left to make are
often subjective and detrimental to the carriers).
17
See infra Part II.A (describing the developments of worker’s compensation system and
the advent of subrogation rights to further the system’s purpose).
18
See infra Part II.B (detailing the advent of the tort reform movement in the wake of the
healthcare crises and how this movement has impacted the collateral source rule across the
country).
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language of Indiana’s collateral source statute.19 Finally, Part IV will
propose that the Collateral Source Act, if reformed at all in the context of
worker’s compensation payments, be amended to mandate that benefit
payments are included in the damages award.20 Either a reversion to the
common law collateral source rule or the proposed amendment would
eliminate the risk of depriving carriers of their statutorily enumerated
lien rights, prevent jury confusion, and eradicate the risk of contradicting
the Act’s own purpose.21
II. BACKGROUND
This Part explains the development of worker’s compensation law,
the tort reform movement, and the drastic effect the recent comingling of
the two areas of law has had on the statutorily enumerated rights of
worker’s compensation carriers.
First, Part II.A explores the
development and purpose of the worker’s compensation system with an
analysis of recent trends.22 Second Part II.B discusses the reasoning
employed by various state legislatures when applying subrogation and
lien rights. Third, Part II.C details the tort reform movement to abolish
the collateral source rule.23 Part II.C also explains the states’ various
attempts, both failed and successful, to abolish the rule.24 Finally, Part
II.D explores how these two areas of law have recently begun to overlap
and explains how this new phenomenon affects subrogation rights in
Indiana.25 Part II.D further explains other states’ approaches in this area
with an analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition of the risks of
improper abrogation.26

19
See infra Part III (discussing how the courts will have proper direction in deciding
worker’s compensation subrogation cases only when the intent of the legislature is clear).
20
See infra Part IV (noting that the problems facing present and future litigants and the
judicial system face can be eliminated with the proposed amendment).
21
See infra Part IV (explaining that the proposed amendment would give clear guidance
to courts, which is currently lacking).
22
See infra Part II.A (describing how cost and claims trends have changed recently due
to the current recession).
23
See infra Part II.C (explaining that the tort reform movement was initiated to reduce
costs and the onslaught of frivolous lawsuits triggered by the rising costs in the health care
industry).
24
See infra Part II.C (explaining how some of the state’s abrogated collateral source
statutes have been found unconstitutional).
25
See infra Part II.D (detailing how worker’s compensation carriers’ subrogation rights
have been affected by the tort reform movement).
26
See infra Part II.D (discussing how the Supreme Court has recommended that
procedures be outlined by the states to ensure the juries do not misapply damage awards).
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A. History and Development of Worker’s Compensation
The deplorable and treacherous working conditions of the
nineteenth century climaxed during the peak of the Industrial
Revolution.27 Due to hazardous working conditions, states developed
worker’s compensation as the solution, with the underlying motivation
to protect employers from costly civil judgments and reimburse
employees for lost wages and medical expenses.28 Following England’s
example, the United States enacted the Federal Employment
Compensation Act in 1908, providing disability benefits for federal
employees.29 In 1911, Wisconsin became the first state to develop its own

27
GARY L. WICKERT, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SUBROGATION IN ALL 50 STATES 1–2 (3d
ed. 2007); see also MARGARET C. JASPER, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW 1–3 (2d ed. 2008)
(outlining the development and purpose of the worker’s compensation system).
Treacherous conditions were experienced by workers in every industry during this time
period as explained below:
[T]he depressing story is almost unchanged from the handloom
weaver and framework knitter of the 1830s and 40s to the nailmaker
and needlewoman of the 1880s and 1890s. It appears, then, that
whether a worker was employed in a textile factory (the most extreme
case) or in a small workshop, he suffered a marked deterioration in his
life at work—the obvious consequence of the quickening pace of
industrialization.
Eric Hopkins, Working Hours and Conditions During the Industrial Revolution: A Re-Appraisal,
35 ECON. HIST. REV. 1, 52 (1982).
28
WICKERT, supra note 27, at 1–5. Although civil litigation during the Industrial
Revolution favored employers, when the employee did win, there was a good chance it
would cause the employer to go bankrupt. See RAYMOND HOGLER, EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 80–83 (2004) (explaining
why employers supported worker’s compensation programs even though employees often
lost common law personal injury suits).
29
5 U.S.C. §§ 8101–8193 (2006). As the industrial revolution grew, so did the occurrence
of workplace injuries, and the present common law rules governing employment could not
deal with this sharp rise in injured workers. HOGLER, supra note 28, at 83. As these
problems arose, U.S. judges and legislatures looked to England, which had developed a
similar system to address these issues. Id. However, under the English rule, an employee
had to prove that the employer’s negligence caused the injury, but the rule ultimately
codified by the United States did not require negligence to recover. Id. at 84.
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worker’s compensation program.30
By 1949, all fifty states had
established their own programs.31
The development of worker’s compensation is unique in several
respects.32 First, the worker’s compensation systems are developed and
run by the states, not the federal government.33 Second, employers
advocated for the development of worker’s compensation despite the
previously favorable common law remedies.34 Before the worker’s
compensation scheme, the courts favored employers and precluded
employee recovery because of the employer-employee contractual
relationship.35 Under worker’s compensation, injured employees are
guaranteed a fixed amount of benefits in exchange for relinquishing their
ability to sue the employer.36
30
Betsy J. Grey, Homeland Security and Federal Relief: A Proposal for a Permanent
Compensation System for Domestic Terrorist Victims, 9 N.Y.U J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 663, 706
n.221 (2005); see Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N.W. 209, 215 (Wis. 1911) (sustaining the state’s
organic compensation scheme that foreclosed employer common law defenses); Peter
Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 723, 730 (1992) (noting that many
states quickly followed Wisconsin’s lead, with “all but eight American states” enacting
worker’s compensation statutes by the 1920s).
31
JASPER, supra note 27, at 2. The author explains that the state statutes vary
significantly in their operation, oversight, and benefit provisions. See generally id.
(reviewing variations in worker’s compensation statutes).
32
HOGLER, supra note 28, at 80. The author explains several reasons why the system is
unique, foremost being that it seems to contradict the best interests of the employer. Id. at
80–84.
33
HOGLER, supra note 28, at 80. The system of recovery is entirely determined by the
respective state and not overseen by the federal government—unlike other forms of
disability benefits, such as Medicare and Social Security. Id. at 80–85.
34
Id. at 80. The Industrial Age was especially hard on employees because of both the
deplorable conditions and the employer’s usual immunity in the event of a workplace
injury. JOHN JUDE MORAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: NEW CHALLENGES IN THE BUSINESS
ENVIRONMENT 455 (3d ed. 2005). The author explains the hardships employees faced:
During the Industrial Age, many workers labored under the most
deplorable conditions, such as the lack of heat, lighting, and
ventilation . . . . Workers for the most part assumed the risk of injury.
Recovering damages for loss of earnings, medical expenses, and pain
and suffering was rare. The employee suffered not only an injury but
also the possible loss of his or her job for nonperformance. Coworkers
were afraid to testify for fear of employer retaliation. Even worse than
that was the courts’ allowance of the legal defenses of fellow servant
negligence and assumption of risk.
Id.
35
See MORAN, supra note 34, at 455 (detailing the limited options of recourse for
employees during the Industrial Age). Hogler also details how an employer could contract
with the employee for immunity in the event of an injury before the development of
worker’s compensation. HOGLER, supra note 28, at 80–90.
36
HOGLER, supra note 28, at 80. Essentially, the system works as an insurance program
for the employer, as it pays a premium either to the state fund or private insurance carrier,
and the insurer decides which claims should be paid at the state-mandated rate. Id. at 81.
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As the nation’s earliest tort reform, worker’s compensation replaced
tort recovery for workplace injuries.37 This system provides for a nofault system of recovery for medical expenses and lost wages for injuries
arising in the scope of one’s employment.38 Worker’s compensation is
designed to quickly compensate for a wide range of injuries, unlike
Medicaid, Medicare, or Social Security.39 The manner in which an
injured employee recovers under worker’s compensation varies by state,
and is defined by the respective state’s statute.40
Most states, like Indiana, require employers to carry worker’s
compensation insurance.41 This mandate makes worker’s compensation
insurance the largest insurance line in the country.42 Collectively, the
fifty states’ worker’s compensation systems pay more in support for
disabled workers than any other source of support, surpassed only by
Social Security.43 When an injured employee files a successful claim, the
benefits are paid by the employer or the employer’s insurance carrier, as
directed by the Workers’ Compensation Board.44 The states’ systems
outline methods of recovery and payment schedules for different claims

Ellen S. Pryor, Part of the Whole: Tort Law’s Compensatory Failures Through a Wider Lens,
27 REV. LITIG. 307, 313 (2008) (citing Ishita Sengupta, Virginia Reno & John F. Burton, Jr.,
Workers’ Compensation: Benefits, Coverage, and Costs, 2005, 2007 NAT’L ACAD. SOC. INS. 6).
38
HOGLER, supra note 28, at 80; see id. at 80-81 (explaining that in exchange for worker’s
compensation benefits, the employer will not be held liable).
39
See Pryor, supra note 37, at 313 (citing Sengupta, et. al, supra note 37, at 6). Unlike
Social Security, worker’s compensation covers short-term wage loss and partial permanent
disabilities; however, similar to Medicaid, it provides compensation for long-term
disabilities. Id. In 2002, eighty percent of worker’s compensation benefits went to
permanent injuries or death. Id. (citing Sengupta et. al, supra note 37, at 7).
40
WICKERT, supra note 27, at 1. Some states provide coverage through a Monopolistic
State Fund. Id. These states include North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. Id. Some states have state-run worker’s compensation funds that compete with
private carriers including Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland,
Minnesota, Montana, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah. Id. at
1–2.
41
See generally id. at 1–15. The states that do not mandate private insurance coverage
usually require the employer to pay into the state fund for worker’s compensation. Id.
42
Id. at 2. “The estimated premiums for 2002 were in excess of $60 billion,” and the
states with the largest premiums are California, Pennsylvania, Illinois, New York, and
Texas. Id.
43
Rudolph L. Rose, Insurance Fraud and Workers’ Compensation, in CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN INSURANCE LAW 2010, at 187, 198 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course
Handbook Ser. No. 811, 2010). The worker’s compensation programs in the fifty states,
combined with federal programs, paid $56 billion in 2004. Id.
44
JASPER, supra note 27, at 1–50; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-1-1 (West 2005)
(explaining the function of Indiana’s state run Workmen’s Compensation Board).
37
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in an attempt to streamline the process.45 Indiana, like most other states,
facilitates a unique worker’s compensation process to help protect the
employer and carrier’s interest.46
1.

Development of Worker’s Compensation in Indiana

In Indiana, like in most states, the worker’s compensation scheme
was created for the employee’s benefit—a benefit that the courts have
construed liberally.47 In Freel v. Foster Forbes Glass Co., the appellate court
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-7(b) (West 2005). Section 22-3-3-7(b) of the Indiana Code
explains the payment schedule deadlines set by the Workmen’s Compensation Board and
the requirements when case liability is in question. Id. The requirements are as follows:
(b) The first weekly installment of compensation for temporary
disability is due fourteen (14) days after the disability begins. Not later
than fifteen (15) days from the date that the first installment of
compensation is due, the employer or the employer’s insurance carrier
shall tender to the employee or to the employee’s dependents, with all
compensation due, a properly prepared compensation agreement in a
form prescribed by the [compensation] board. Whenever an employer
or the employer’s insurance carrier denies or is not able to determine
liability to pay compensation or benefits, the employer or the
employer’s insurance carrier shall notify the workers’ compensation
board and the employee in writing on a form prescribed by the
workers’ compensation board not later than thirty (30) days after the
employer’s knowledge of the claimed injury. If a determination of
liability cannot be made within thirty (30) days, the workers’
compensation board may approve an additional thirty (30) days upon
a written request of the employer or the employer’s insurance carrier
that sets forth the reasons that the determination could not be made
within thirty (30) days and states the facts or circumstances that are
necessary to determine liability within the additional thirty (30) days.
Id.
46
See supra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining the Indiana worker’s
compensation system process). Worker’s compensation programs paid $56 billion in
benefits in 2004. Rose, supra note 43, at 198. The cost to employers for worker’s
compensation was $87.4 billion, an increase of seven percent. Id. In 2003, the National
Insurance Crime Bureau estimated worker’s compensation fraud losses at $6 billion per
year. Id.
47
See Mayes v. Second Injury Fund, 888 N.E.2d 773, 777 (Ind. 2008) (describing the
liberal interpretation that should be used when considering employee protection under the
state’s worker’s compensation system). In resolving a plausible dispute as to whether the
Workmen’s Compensation Board’s actions constituted approval of a continuation of
liability for an injured employee after her third-party settlement, the court concluded that it
did because injured employee’s benefits should be liberally construed. Id.; see DePuy, Inc.
v. Farmer, 847 N.E.2d 160, 170-71 (Ind. 2006) (providing justifications for a liberal
construction); Daugherty v. Indus. Contracting & Erecting, 802 N.E.2d 912, 918-19 (Ind.
2004) (citing to Virginia cases as additional support for a liberal construction); Roberts v.
ACandS, Inc., 873 N.E.2d 1055, 1058-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that the Act must
be construed liberally for the benefit of both parties to achieve the “humane purpose” of
the Act).
45
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held that the purpose of Indiana’s worker’s compensation system is to
put the burden of caring for those injured within the scope of their
employment on employers and the consumers of that company’s
products.48
In rejecting Freel’s argument that Foster Forbes, the employer and
insurance carrier, was not entitled to a set-off for benefits already paid,
the court based its conclusion on the belief that recognizing a set-off “is
consistent with the purposes of the act.”49 Without the credit, the court
found that the Freels would not only experience a double recovery for
the same injury, but would receive from Foster Forbes more money for
the period of disability than could have been earned if there had been no

48
Freel v. Foster Forbes Glass Co., 449 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). The
plaintiffs in the action were Thomas Freel and the injured employee’s dependants, and
there was no evidence in the record that his occupational injury caused his death. Id. at
1150. In Freel, the employer, Foster Forbes, was self-insured for purposes of worker’s
compensation, and subsequently paid the total temporary disability payments to the
defendant, Freel. Id. at 1151. The benefits were paid pursuant to a wage continuation plan,
but the court reasoned that although the benefits were in effect a contract for payment, this
contract did not terminate the employer/insurer’s rights to a lien and reimbursement for
payments in a third-party action. Id. Although Freel argued that the contract brought the
payments outside the Workmen’s Compensation Board’s review, the court denied this
argument and found the payments were properly before the court based on section 22-3-323(a) of the Indiana Code. Id. This code section states as follows:
Any payments made by the employer to the injured employee during
the period of his disability, or to his dependents, which . . . were not
due and payable when made, may, subject to the approval of the
worker’s compensation board, be deducted from the amount to be
paid as compensation. However, the deduction shall be made from
the distal end of the period during which compensation must be paid,
except in cases of temporary disability.
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-23(a) (West 2005).
49
Freel, 449 N.E.2d at 1151. The court explained that such a credit is consistent with the
purpose of Indiana’s Worker’s Compensation Act. Id. The court explained that the wage
continuation plan should not negate the employer’s lien because such a result would go
against public policy. Id. The court explained this determination as follows:
An employer who has paid an employee at the time of that employee’s
greatest need more than he was obligated to pay should not be
penalized by being denied full credit for the amount paid above the
requirements of the act as against the amount which might
subsequently be determined to be due the employee. To do so would
inevitably cause employers to be less generous. By limiting the
payments the employer can safely make to the amount of temporary
total disability the result would be that the employee would lose his
full salary at the very moment he needs it most. Such a construction is
neither liberal nor one made with a view to the public welfare.
Id. (quoting Cowan v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 529 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)).
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injury.50 Although the decision recognized other purposes of the Indiana
Workmen’s Compensation Act, the court explicitly stated that the
Indiana case law “evince[s] a strong policy against double recovery.”51
Pursuant to the Indiana Code, worker’s compensation is an
employee’s exclusive remedy for work-related injuries.52 If there are any
issues about the compensability of a claim, all disputes are resolved
before the Worker’s Compensation Board.53 Indiana employers and
carriers, like those throughout the rest of the nation, have to remain
cognizant of the recent increase in worker’s compensation litigation,
especially as the nation continues to suffer through one of its worst
recessions.54 Due to the recession, employees are more likely than ever
to claim worker’s compensation benefits, resulting in a dramatic increase
in fraudulent claims.55
50
Id. The benefits were paid pursuant to a wage continuation plan created between
Freel and Foster Forbes, but the court still found that the plan developed between the
parties did not preclude the requirement for lien repayment. Id.
51
Id. (citing IND. CODE § 22-3-2-13; IND. CODE § 22-3-3-10; IND. CODE § 22-3-3-23; IND.
CODE § 22-3-3-31; Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Dipolito, 344 N.E.2d 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976);
Snow Hill Coal Corp. v. Cook, 109 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 1952); Bebout v. F.L. Mendez
& Co., 37 N.E.2d 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 1941)).
52
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-6 (West 2005). The code section states:
The rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to [Indiana
Code] 22-3-2 through [Indiana Code] 22-3-6 on account of personal
injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies
of such employee, the employee’s personal representatives,
dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of
such injury or death, except for remedies available under [Indiana
Code] 5-2-6.1.
Id.
53
Id. § 22-3-4-5. The statute explains the procedure of compensation disputes as follows:
(a) If the employer and the injured employee or the injured employee’s
dependents disagree in regard to the compensation payable under
[Indiana Code] 22-3-2 through [Indiana Code] 22-3-6 or, if they have
reached such an agreement, which has been signed by them, filed with
and approved by the worker’s compensation board, and afterward
disagree as to the continuance of payments under such agreement, or
as to the period for which payments shall be made, or to the amount to
be paid, because of a change in conditions since the making of such
agreement, either party may then make an application to the board for
the determination of the matters in dispute.
Id.
54
See Roberto Ceniceros, Hard-up Investigators Battle Against Rise in Comp Fraud, BUS. INS.
(Nov. 8, 2009), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20091108/ISSUE01/311089974
(explaining that the recession has triggered a wave of frivolous claims); see also infra note 58
and accompanying text (describing the rise in frivolous lawsuits including worker’s
compensation).
55
See Ceniceros, supra note 54 (stating that the recession has triggered a rise in
fraudulent worker’s compensation claims); infra Part II.A.2 (examining the effect of the
Great Recession on worker’s compensation benefits). The increased number of fraudulent
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Recent Trends in Worker’s Compensation: The Recession Effect

The recession has significantly impacted all parties involved in the
worker’s compensation process, despite procedures designed to
streamline the process.56 Worker’s compensation insurance carriers have
experienced double-digit premiums and profit losses.57 Claim frequency
decreased in 2009, but fraudulent claims have increased significantly
since the beginning of the recession.58
Increased fraudulent claims and competition with lower demand has
caused worker’s compensation carriers to incur steep profit losses.59
Indemnity claim costs are also a concern for parties to worker’s
compensation systems, as states are becoming more willing to impose
the intervention requirement to guarantee the subrogation rights of
carriers.60 The right to subrogation is important to carriers because of the
cost savings; however, this right is not always guaranteed.61

claims can be an indication that employers’ ability to cut costs and stay afloat may be
weakened, especially since fewer jobs are now available. Ceniceros, supra note 54.
56
Ceniceros, supra note 54; see also infra note 57 and accompanying text (describing the
decline in carriers’ profitability).
57
Joan E. Collier, Long Recession Hammers Comp Carriers, PROPERTYCASUALTY360º (Aug.
30, 2010), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2010/08/30/long-recession-hammerscomp-carriers-. Profitability is declining rapidly for worker’s compensation carriers,
according to Rober P. Hartwig, president of the Insurance Information Institute. Id. “We
are earning about 40-to-50 percent less than we were pre-crises . . . .” Id. He went on to
explain that the demand for worker’s compensation coverage has declined in correlation
with the rising unemployment rate over the last two years, causing the largest impact to
worker’s compensation in sixty years. Id.
58
Ceniceros, supra note 54; see also Stephen J. Klingel, Wokers’ Comp in a Precarious
Position, PROPERTYCASUALTY360º (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/
2010/08/16/workers-comp-in-a-precarious-position (explaining that claim frequency in
2009 has continued to decline due to a tightened job market). Worker’s compensation
fraud appears to be rising rapidly, except cases of claimants who take on jobs while also
claiming to be disabled, which can be explained by the limited availability of jobs.
Ceniceros, supra note 54.
59
Klingel, supra note 58. Worker’s compensation insurance industry faces several
challenges. Id.
60
See WICKERT, supra note 27, at 33 (listing the states that have imposed an intervention
requirement). Arkansas is one such state that has imposed an intervention requirement.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-410(b)(1) (West 2011); see also John Garner Meats v. Ault, 828
S.W.2d 866, 867 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting the statute’s requirements). Arkansas
law requires the carrier to intervene or risk losing its subrogation interest, one of the
minority of states to have such a requirement. See id. at 867 (interpreting section 11-9410(b)(1) of the Arkansas Code); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-11.1 (West 2011) (explaining
that Georgia law requires intervention by carrier to protect subrogation rights).
61
See Collier, supra note 57 (explaining that indemnity costs are finally starting to slow
down); see also WICKERT, supra note 27, at 33 (listing states that have imposed an
intervention requirement on carriers).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss4/6

Kauther: Indiana's Collateral Source Act: Confusing Courts and Underminin

2012]

Collateral Source Act

1149

B. Right to Subrogation for Carriers
“Subrogation is the right of the insurer to be put in the position of
the insured in order to pursue recovery from third parties legally
responsible to the insured for a loss paid by the insurer.”62 A carrier’s
right to subrogation will usually be protected under common law and
various states’ statutes.63 Very few areas of law vary more than the area
of worker’s compensation subrogation.64 Other than underwriting,
subrogation is one of just a few areas in the insurance industry where
money is “paid to the carrier rather than by the carrier.”65 All states have
some type of third-party liability subrogation act.66 The Indiana Code
“makes the employee in effect a constructive trustee for the employer of
that portion of the settlement [or judgment] necessary to fully reimburse
the employer for amounts it expended on the employee’s behalf under
the Act.”67 Some states have reaffirmed this notion that the employee is
the carrier’s trustee. Courts have found that a claimant and a third-party

62
John Dwight Ingram, Priority Between Insurer and Insured in Subrogation Recoveries, 3
CONN. INS. L.J. 105, 106–07 (1996–1997) (quoting 16 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 61.1 (Ronald A. Anderson & Mark S. Rhodes eds., rev. ed. 1983)).
63
See WICKERT, supra note 27, at 25–33 (demonstrating the bulk of the fifty states’
different subrogation statutes). Each state has its own separate subrogation statute. Id.
Virginia’s subrogation statute is a typical subrogation statute. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2309(A) (West 2011). Virginia’s subrogation statute reads as follows:
A) A claim against an employer under this title for injury, occupational
disease, or death benefits shall create a lien on behalf of the employer
against any verdict or settlement arising from any right to recover
damages which the injured employee, his personal representative or
other person may have against any other party for such injury . . . and
such employer also shall be subrogated to any such right and may
enforce, in his own name or in the name of the injured employee or his
personal representative, the legal liability of such other party.
Id.
64
WICKERT, supra note 27, at xxi. “In this age of bad faith litigation, soaring health care
provider costs, increased claims and even insurance fraud, subrogation is one of the
insurance carrier’s most effective tools for maintaining profitability.” Id. “[A]llocating
subrogation recoveries in the context of worker’s compensation claims is not only complex,
but it also requires an understanding of the intricacies of various state worker’s
compensation laws which even their own judiciary often do not understand or agree on.”
Id. at 31.
65
Id. at xxi. This ability for carriers’ to recoup the costs expended in paying for
disability benefits helps to keep the premiums charged to employers as low as possible. Id.
66
See id. at 25–33 (providing each state’s respective subrogation statute and its
requirements).
67
State v. Mileff, 520 N.E.2d 123, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). The court explained that a
valid lien is created against any person with notice of the lien who subsequently acquires
the property subject to it, pursuant to section 22-3-2-13 of the Indiana Code. Id.; see also
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-13 (West 2005) (describing a carriers’ lien).
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are liable to the subrogating carrier if they settle a claim without
reimbursing a carrier.68
The purpose of subrogation statutes, in most instances, is to prevent
double recovery by the injured employee from both the compensation
carrier and the tortfeasor.69 Another purpose of subrogation is to ensure
that the liable party is not absolved merely because the insured received
insurance for her own benefit.70 In preventing double recovery, courts
have found that worker’s compensation usually grants carriers first
priority in third-party actions.71 Although all fifty states provide for
some form of subrogation for worker’s compensation carriers, the
specifics and requirements of vindicating those rights vary from state to
state. Indiana is one such state that has a long history of recognizing and
protecting carriers’ subrogation rights.72

68
WICKERT, supra note 27, at 20–30. Texas is an active worker’s compensation litigation
state and has several court holdings that mandate such notice to carriers, as demonstrated
in multiple Texas Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 24 (citing Capitol Aggregates, Inc. v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 408 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Tex. 1966); Pan Am. Ins. Co. v. Hi-Plains Haulers,
Inc., 350 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. 1961); Forth Worth Lloyds v. Haygood, 246 S.W.2d 865, 869
(Tex. 1952); Prewitt & Sampson v. City of Dallas, 713 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986);
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. W. Tex. Utils. Co., 165 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Tex. Comm’n App.
1942)).
69
Numerous courts have acknowledged the same strong policy consideration. See, e.g.,
Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Nat’l Emp. Care Sys., Inc., 469 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2006);
Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 N.E.2d 374, 379 (Ind. 2010); Old Republic Ins.
Co. v. Ashley, 722 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
70
See Capitol Aggregates, 408 S.W.2d at 924 (stating that the purpose of subrogation
statutes is to protect the carrier, reduce the insurance burden to employers, and ensure that
the ultimate burden is placed on the negligent party that caused the loss or injury in the
first place); see also Ingram, supra note 62, at 107–08 (explaining that the doctrine of
subrogation is based on principles of equity).
71
Smith v. Gary Pub. Transp. Corp., 893 N.E.2d 1137, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The
court denied Smith’s claim that Gary Public Transportation Corporation (“GPTC”) was
capable of being sued, concluding that a self-insured employer does not constitute “an
other person,” and is therefore not eligible for suit under section 22-3-2-13 of the Indiana
Code. Id. Furthermore, the court went on to find that the “statute also allows an employer
or worker’s compensation insurer to attach a lien to any damages the injured employee
received from the third party. ‘The purpose of the statute is to make the employer or its
carrier whole and prevent a double recovery by the worker.”’ Id. (quoting Walkup v.
Wabash Nat’l Corp., 702 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ind. 1998)). The court further stipulated that to
require GPTC to pay once as an employer and once as an insurer “does not advance the
policy of Indiana Code Section 22-3-2-13.” Id.
72
See infra note 74 and accompanying text (describing Indiana decisions that have
strongly disfavored double recovery).
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Indiana Subrogation

In Indiana, worker’s compensation subrogation is governed by
section 22-3-2-13 of the Indiana Code.73 As a myriad of decisions
evidence, Indiana strongly disfavors double recovery.74 The courts have
held, “[t]he purpose of the lien is to prevent double recovery on the part
of the injured employee.”75 At the same time, the state’s statute aims to
protect the employer, but not the negligent party.76
Unlike most other states, Indiana requires that carriers pay their
“pro-rata share of the reasonable and necessary costs and expenses of
asserting the third party claim.”77 However, the appellate court has
found that payment of those expenses by a carrier does not need to occur
until after settlement.78 The appellate court held that the denial of the
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-13 (West 2005). The statute provides that when “judgment is
obtained and paid, and accepted . . . then from the amount received by the employee or
dependents there shall be paid to the employer or the . . . carrier . . . the amount of
compensation paid to the employee or dependents.” Id.
74
For examples of Indiana cases disfavoring double recovery, see Travelers Indem. Co.,
927 N.E.2d at 379; Mayes v. Second Injury Fund, 888 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Ind. 2008); DePuy,
Inc. v. Farmer, 847 N.E.2d 160, 171 (Ind. 2006); Spangler, Jennings & Dougherty P.C. v. Ind.
Ins. Co., 729 N.E.2d 117, 124 (Ind. 2000); Walkup, 702 N.E.2d at 715; Smith, 893 N.E.2d at
1139; Ansert Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Ansert, 690 N.E.2d 305, 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997);
Freel v. Foster Forbes Glass Co., 449 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
75
Ansert, 690 N.E.2d at 309 (citing Freel, 449 N.E.2d at 1151).
76
N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Milhiser, 106 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 1952). The court found that
the purpose of the Worker’s Compensation Act was for repayment of the employer and not
for a negligent third-party. Id. The court further found that the third-party should be
“legally liable for the full amount of damages caused by his negligence.” Id.
77
§ 22-3-2-13. The statute stipulates the following:
[I]f the action against the other person is brought by the injured
employee or his dependents and judgment is obtained and paid, and
accepted or settlement is made with the other person, either with or
without suit, then from the amount received by the employee or
dependents there shall be paid to the employer or the employer’s
compensation insurance carrier, subject to its paying its pro-rata share
of the reasonable and necessary costs and expenses of asserting the
third party claim, the amount of compensation paid to the employee or
dependents, plus the medical, surgical, hospital and nurses’ services
and supplies and burial expenses paid by the employer or the
employer’s compensation insurance carrier and the liability of the
employer or the employer’s compensation insurance carrier to pay
further compensation or other expenses shall thereupon terminate,
whether or not one (1) or all of the dependents are entitled to share in
the proceeds of the settlement or recovery and whether or not one (1)
or all of the dependents could have maintained the action or claim for
wrongful death.
Id.
78
Welter v. F.A. Wilhelm Constr., 743 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). In Welter
v. F.A. Wilhelm Construction, the court held that a carrier had not waived its lien by not
73
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carrier’s lien rights would go against the Indiana subrogation statute’s
“strong policy against an injured employee receiving ‘double
recovery.’”79
Schneider National Carriers, Inc. v. National Employee Care Systems, Inc.
concerns lien rights of worker’s compensation carriers under Indiana
law.80 In Schneider, the injured employee and tortfeasor entered into a
settlement agreement for a lesser amount than was paid in worker’s
compensation benefits without notifying or reimbursing the employer’s
carrier.81 The court held in favor of the carrier, stating that to find
otherwise would promote improper settlements and leave the carrier
with nowhere to turn for the recovery it was owed.82 Such a result, the
paying its share of expenses as they were incurred. Id. Welter was injured on the job by a
third-party, and he subsequently settled his lawsuit after receiving worker’s compensation
benefits from his employer’s various carriers. Id. at 1256. The court explained that
payment need not be made by the employer because the pro-rata share of expenses could
not be determined until after a settlement had been reached. Id. at 1259. The court held
that the carrier had not waived its subrogation right by not paying “its pro rata share of the
costs and expenses as they were being incurred.” Id. at 1256.
79
Id. at 1258. The court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for the
employer’s carrier after the carrier intervened to secure its lien right. Id. at 1259. The court
further explained that “prohibition against double recovery had been a part of worker’s
compensation law since its inception and remains intact.” Id. at 1258. The court stipulated
that the trial court was correct in its summary judgment ruling for the carrier because it
relied “upon the clear and unambiguous language of the statute.” Id. at 1259. The court
further explained that although the legislature never intended to abridge the remedies an
employee has against a third-party in tort law, it sought to prevent an injured party from
experiencing a double recovery. Id. at 1258 (citing Waldridge v. Futurex Indus., Inc., 714
N.E.2d 783, 786 (Ind. Ct. App 1999)).
80
469 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2006). In Schneider, a truck driver was injured on the job by
a third-party tortfeasor and subsequently received worker’s compensation benefits. Id. at
655. The injured worker sued the tortfeasor’s employer to collect damages. Id. Initially the
carrier sought intervention to secure its subrogation but withdrew after reassurances of lien
protection from the parties. Id. The court found that joinder in an action against a thirdparty isn’t required, as an “employer may, within ninety (90) days after receipt of notice of
suit . . . join in the action upon his motion so that all orders of court after hearing and
judgment shall be made for his protection.” Id. at 658 (quoting IND. CODE § 22-3-2-13, ¶ 8);
see also Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1309 (Ind. 1998) (discussing joinder in
third-party actions).
81
Schneider, 469 F.3d at 656. Despite the pre-settlement representations to the carrier by
the employee and the third-party that the lien would be protected, the carrier never
received its portion. Id. While negotiating the settlement with the third-party, the
employee provided in their written agreement that he would assume responsibility of the
carriers’ lien rights and indemnify the tortfeasor. Id. The district court, based on the
written agreement’s indemnity provision, held that the employee was solely responsible to
pay the lien. Id. at 657. The employee appealed, arguing that the carrier waived its lien
right by failing to timely intervene. Id. Further, the employee argues that he is under no
duty to protect the carrier’s interests. Id.
82
Id. The court held in favor of the carrier, a decision the court found was in furtherance
of the purpose and requirements of the state’s workers’ compensation statute. Id. at 659–
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court explained, would undermine the purpose of the state’s subrogation
statute to protect the interests of carriers.83
The Seventh Circuit in Schneider, applying Indiana worker’s
compensation law, held that carriers’ lien rights “are clearly
established.”84 Since the creation of worker’s compensation in Indiana,
carriers’ liens have been given priority in third-party awards.85 The
court held that the statute itself gives worker’s compensation carriers
lien rights, and “there is nothing in the Indiana statute or its interpretive
case law that makes intervention anything other than permissive.”86 A
60. The court referenced Indiana’s subrogation statute to make its ruling. Id. The court
explained that the statute “requir[ed] the lienholder’s approval of any settlement between
the injured employee and the third-party tortfeasor.” Id. at 657. Thus, it was clear by the
ruling that to find for the employee, and against the carrier, would be contrary to the
court’s interpretation of the statute. Id. at 658 (citing Koval, 693 N.E.2d at 1309). The
Schneider court specifically explained, “[b]ecause settlement serves as a bar to further
recovery against the third-party, without a consent requirement, an employee could settle a
lawsuit for an amount well below . . . costs and leave the employer with nowhere to turn
for the additional money owed.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Koval, 693 N.E.2d at 1309).
83
Id. at 659–60. The court concluded the worker’s compensation carrier would be left
“with nowhere to turn for the additional money owed” undermining the purpose of the
state’s subrogation statute meant to protect carriers’ interests. Id. at 658. The court,
reiterating the Indiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of the subrogation statute’s purpose,
mandated that “[t]he employer must either give written consent or be ‘fully indemnified or
protected by court order.’” Id. (quoting Koval, 693 N.E.2d at 1309).
84
Id. at 657. The court explained that by operation of section 22-3-2-13 of the Indiana
Code, the carriers’ rights “are clearly established.” Id. The statute provides in pertinent
part:
[T]he injured employee . . . may commence legal proceedings against
the
other
person
to
recover
damages
notwithstanding
the . . . compensation
insurance
carrier’s
payment
of . . . compensation . . . . In that case, however, if the action against the
other person is brought by the injured employee . . . and . . . settlement
is made with the other person, either with or without suit, then from
the amount received by the employee . . . there shall be paid to
the . . . employer’s compensation insurance carrier . . . the amount of
compensation paid to the employee . . . .
....
If the injured employee . . . shall agree to receive compensation
from . . . the employer’s compensation insurance carrier . . . the
empoyer’s compensation insurance carrier shall have a lien upon any
settlement award . . . out of which the employee might be compensated
from the third party.
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-13 (West 2005) (emphasis added).
85
Schneider, 469 F.3d at 657; Ind. State Highway Comm’n v. White, 291 N.E.2d 550, 552
(Ind. 1973); Welter v. F.A. Wilhelm Constr., 743 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001);
Dearing v. Perry, 499 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
86
Schneider, 469 F.3d at 658. The court held that a carrier is a lienholder, rather than a
subrogee, and requires notice of a third-party settlement and must give its consent
regardless of whether it chooses to intervene in the action. Id. at 658–59. Determining that
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new development in the determination of lien rights for worker’s
compensation carriers has been the recent tort reform movement and its
effect on the collateral source rule.87
C. Tort Reform: Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule is both a rule of evidence and a rule of
damages.88 The collateral source rule bars the introduction of evidence
of payments at trial if the plaintiff was reimbursed by a collateral source
for sustained injuries.89 It was first adopted in England, where it arose
with the dawn of commercial insurance and was adopted by U.S.
jurisdictions over 150 years ago.90 It was first announced by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1854.91
A collateral source is any payment “from a source wholly
independent of the tort-feasor.”92 The most typical example of a
collateral source is health insurance benefits received by a plaintiff, but
disability and unemployment benefits such as Medicaid, Medicare, and

intervention was not required, the court stated that “there is nothing in the Indiana statute
or its interpretive case law that makes intervention anything other than permissive; there is
no authority for the proposition that intervention is a necessary prerequisite to the operation
of the statutory lien rights.” Id. at 658. The court dismissed the employee’s argument that
the carrier was required to intervene in the action against the third-party to secure its
subrogation right. Id. at 659.
87
See infra Part II.C (discussing the development of the tort reform movement and its
effect on the collateral source rule).
88
Bryce Benjet, A Review of State Law Modifying the Collateral Source Rule: Seeking Greater
Fairness in Economic Damages Awards, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 210, 210 (2009).
89
See Daena A. Goldsmith, A Survey of the Collateral Source Rule: The Effects of Tort Reform
and Impact on Multistate Litigation, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 799, 799 (1988) (“Under this rule, a
defendant must bear the full cost of the injury he caused the plaintiff, regardless of any
compensation the plaintiff receives from an independent or ‘collateral’ source.”).
90
Benjet, supra note 88, at 210; see Jamie L. Wershbale, Tort Reform in America: Abrogating
the Collateral Source Rule Across the States, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 346, 348 (2008) (detailing the
impact of the insurance industry and the strength of the tort reform movement).
91
Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. 152, 152 (1854). The Court for the first time
allowed evidence of insurance payments and held that such payments could not relieve a
negligent third-party of liability. Id. at 155.
92
Do v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 779 N.W.2d 853, 859 (Minn. 2010) (emphasis omitted).
The court relied on Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of collateral source rule:
Under this rule, if an injured person receives compensation for his
injuries from a source wholly independent of the tort-feasor, the payment
should not be deducted from the damages which he would otherwise
collect from the tort-feasor. In other words, a defendant tort-feasor
may not benefit from the fact that the plaintiff has received money
from other sources as a result of the defendant’s tort, e.g. sickness and
health insurance.
Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (6th ed. 1990)).
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worker’s compensation also qualify.93 Although every state retains the
rule in some fashion, recent changes in health care have prompted
critiques and calls for reformation of the rule.94
Critics of the rule, including those who advocate for tort reform,
argue that abolition of the “collateral source rule will both decrease
insurance premiums and reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits.”95
Opponents of reform argue that such abrogation will undermine
America’s tort system and, in accordance with inconclusive empirical
studies, will do little to reduce insurance rates.96 Rule supporters have
advanced several arguments in support of its retention.97 They argue
that plaintiffs require larger recoveries to pay contingent attorney fees.98
The jury will get confused if asked to reduce the damage award by
collateral source payments.99 Additionally, the negligent party should be
forced to bear full responsibility for his wrongdoing and any risk of
windfall should go to the injured party, not the negligent one.100 Further,
placing the full burden on defendants deters negligent conduct.101 The
“primary argument favoring the rule is that third-party collateral”
sources can have a statutorily enumerated subrogation interest in the
benefits the plaintiff receives, which offsets any windfall risk.102 As held
by the Supreme Court, the “likelihood of misuse by the jury clearly

See Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 799–800 (explaining the different areas of benefits).
Benjet, supra note 88, at 211 (citing Michael K. Beard, The Impact of Changes in Health
Care Provider Reimbursement Systems on the Recovery of Damages for Medical Expenses in
Personal Injury Suits, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 453, 458–59 (1998)). “The common law
collateral source rule developed during a time when health insurance and publicly
provided health benefits did not exist.” Id. So although there are still prevalent
justifications for the rule due to the recent changes in health care, it is increasingly viewed
as a windfall for plaintiffs. Id.; see also F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort
Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 457 (2006) (describing the advent of the tort
reform movement in the United States).
95
Wershbale, supra note 90, at 346; see id. (explaining that although tort reform was
intended to reduce insurance premiums and costs, both remain high while the economy is
strained).
96
See id. Empirical studies on tort reform effects on insurance rates concluded “without
a clear result.” Id.
97
See Benjet, supra note 88, at 210 (“Several reasons are advanced to justify the collateral
source rule.”).
98
See id. at 210–11 (citing Beard, supra note 94, at 458–59).
99
Id. at 210–11.
100
See Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 801 (citing Burks v. Webb, 99 S.E.2d 629, 636 (Va.
1957).
101
See Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Cleveland, 369 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Wis. Ct. App.
1985) (explaining that Wisconsin’s collateral source rule is intended to deter negligent
conduct by placing the whole burden on the negligent party).
102
Wershbale, supra note 90, at 349 (citing Hubbard, supra note 94, at 483).
93
94
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outweighs the value of [collateral source] evidence.”103 Recently, state
courts and legislatures have reformed the once common collateral source
rule.104
D. Collateral Source Statute Reform and Its Abrogation of Subrogation Rights
There are numerous arguments in support of collateral source
statute reform, including the following: it allows the injured party to
recover twice for the same injury; the American tort system is “the most
expensive . . . in the world”; and reform would help to reduce costs.105
Reform proponents argue that the rule allows plaintiffs to recover a
windfall.106 Since subrogation is rare, “due to the time and expense
involved in securing subrogation,” reform advocates dispute that the
risk of windfall is not actually eliminated.107
Of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, forty-two have
restricted, in some way, the collateral source rule.108 In those that have,
“there is little uniformity across the jurisdictions as to the manner in
which each has modified the collateral source rule.”109 Some states have
103
Eichel v. N.Y. Cen. R.R. Co., 375 U.S. 253, 255 (1963). The court held that evidence of
collateral payments was properly excluded, explaining that evidence that plaintiff received
collateral source “benefits involves a substantial likelihood of prejudicial impact.” Id.
104
See Wershbale, supra note 90, at 346, 351 (explaining that most states have enacted
legislation that limits the application of the collateral source rule).
105
Id. at 346–47. But see Alexee Deep Conroy, Note, Lessons Learned from the “Laboratories
of Democracy”: A Critique of Federal Medical Liability Reform, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1170–
71 (2006) (arguing that tort reform has no impact on the healthcare crises, one of the biggest
motivators for such reform).
106
Wershbale, supra note 90, at 349. According to the website:
The concern is that where the fact-finder remains uninformed, or there
is no collateral source setoff, a successful plaintiff acquires a windfall,
being awarded monetary damages in excess of necessary and
reasonable medical costs.
Proponents support abolition of the
collateral source rule on the grounds that plaintiffs should not be
compensated twice for the same injury.
Id. (footnote omitted).
107
See id. (citing Hubbard, supra note 94, at 483. Subrogation rights are unenforced due
to “difficulty in establishing that a damage award encompasses the particular collateral
benefits paid out by the insurer, high administrative costs associated with seeking
subrogation, and potential damage to the insurer’s reputation.” Id. at 349–50 (citing
CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES (2004),
available at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5549/Report.pdf); see Ark. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006); Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927
N.E.2d 374 (Ind. 2010) (showing the strong relationship between the collateral source rule
and subrogation rights).
108
Benjet, supra note 88, at 211. Even in jurisdictions where the rule has been applied
generally, it is limited in health care liability cases. Id.
109
Wershbale, supra note 90, at 351. Some jurisdictions have altered the rule exclusively
for medical malpractice cases, others for all personal injury cases, and still others complete
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narrow restrictions and modifications that are only applicable to medical
malpractice cases.110 Other states have changed the collateral source rule
for all personal injury actions.111 The states’ reform acts face various
constitutional challenges and some have been overturned as
unconstitutional.112
Further, lack of uniformity is the consideration of collateral source
evidence by the trier of fact in worker’s compensation cases.113 Some
jurisdictions allow for the presentation of collateral source evidence only
after the verdict is rendered.114 Others allow the trier of fact to consider
such evidence, but do not mandate it.115 A few jurisdictions, pursuant to
subrogation statutes, will disallow a set-off if a collateral source has a
abrogation with exceptions for specific areas such as worker’s compensation. Id. Some
jurisdictions allow the evidence at trial, others allow it only if a subrogation interest exists,
while some only allow the evidence for post-verdict collateral source reductions. Id. at 357.
110
ALA. CODE § 6-5-545 (2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (2003); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3333.1 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2906 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60G (2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (2010);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1D (2004); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.508 (West 1999); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-19-34.1 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-12 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B3-405 (LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT. § 893.55 (2006).
111
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (2005); CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 52-225a, 52-225b, 52-225c (2005); FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 66310 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (2010); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1205.1 (2003); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-2 (West 2011); IOWA CODE § 668.14 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.6303 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 548.36 (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308 (2011); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-97 (West 2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 4545 (McKinney 2007 & Supp
2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20 (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2323.41 (2004) OR. REV. STAT. § 31.580 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.080 (2007); W. VA.
CODE § 55-7B-9a (2008).
112
O’Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571, 578 (Ky. 1995); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d
825, 835 (N.H. 1980), overruled on other grounds by, Cmty. Res. For Justice, Inc., v. City of
Manchester, 917 A.2d 707 (N.H. 2007). Tort reforms meet three different constitutional
challenges, including the right to trial by jury, due process rights, and separation of powers
principles. Wershbale, supra note 90, at 346.
113
Freel v. Foster Forbes Glass Co., 449 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
114
ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.070 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (2005); CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 52-225a, 52-225c (2005); FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT § 663-10 (2011);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (2010); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1205, 5/2-1205.1 (2003); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2906 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60G (2000); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.6303 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 548.36 (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308 (2011);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-97 (West 2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW
§ 4545 (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-06 (2010); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 31.580 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-405 (LexisNexis 2008); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9a
(2008).
115
ALA. CODE § 6-5-545 (2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-2; IOWA CODE § 668.14 (1998);
see also Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind. 2010) (holding that
under the Indiana collateral source statute, the jury was allowed to “consider” the
obligation to repay a workman’s compensation lien, but was not mandated under the jury
instruction given).
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subrogation right.116 Some withhold final judgments until determining
subrogation rights and whether those rights will be pursued.117 Given
the variations of collateral source rule enactments, this area of law has
become less than clear.118 Indiana is one of the several states that have
changed its approach to the collateral source rule.119
1.

Collateral Source Rule in Indiana

Indiana is one of the jurisdictions that has abrogated the common
law collateral source rule.120 In 1986, the Indiana legislature enacted
section 34-44-1-1 through 34-44-1-3 of the Indiana Code, the state’s
collateral source statute.121 In Indiana, the collateral source doctrine
ensures that a plaintiff’s recovery is not reduced due to recovery from
other sources, while preventing double liability for the tortfeasor.122 The
statute allows evidence of worker’s compensation benefits to be
presented to establish proof of the amount of money the plaintiff is
legally required to repay.123 Indiana is one of only fifteen states that

116
ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.17.070, 09.55.548 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (2005);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-225a, 52-225c (2005 & Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (2011);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (2010); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1205, 5/2-1205.1 (2003); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60G (2000); MINN. STAT. § 548.251 (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1308 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.580 (2011).
117
HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2906 (2000); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 600.6303 (2000).
118
See Wershbale, supra note 90, at 352 (“[T]he law in this area has become a jurisdictionspecific legal patchwork.”).
119
Id.
120
Shirley v. Russell, 663 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind. 1996). Plaintiff’s husband, Shirley, was a
public school employee who opted to have extra money taken out of his paycheck to go
into his pension account. Id. The pension payments went to the widow and plaintiff upon
his death. Id. The tortfeasors, on appeal, argued that the district court erred when it
excluded this “collateral source” evidence at trial because the evidence would have off-set
the damage award. Id. The court held that although the collateral source rule had been
abrogated, enumerated exceptions, such as directly paid insurance benefits, still would be
barred from introduction. Id. at 534, 536.
121
See Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Ind. 2010) (explaining
that the stated purposes for the statute were to enable accurate assessment of the party’s
loss and to prevent double recovery); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-1 (West 2011)
(stipulating that the evidence should be considered to preserve lien rights).
122
See CSX Transp., Inc., v. Gardner, 874 N.E.2d 357, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining
that a common effect of these characteristics is that the injured party recovers more than
necessary to make it whole).
123
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-2 (West 2011). The statute states: “In a personal injury or
wrongful death action, the court shall allow the admission into evidence of . . . (2) proof of
the amount of money that the plaintiff is required to repay, including worker’s
compensation benefits, as a result of the collateral benefits received.” Id.
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allows some form of collateral source payment evidence at trial.124 The
statute stipulates that the trier of fact must “consider” collateral source
payment evidence, including worker’s compensation payments, when
determining an award amount.125
After the lower courts rendered different interpretations of the
statute’s language, the Indiana Supreme Court on May 27, 2010, in
Travelers Indemnity Co. of America v. Jarrells, interpreted the “consider”
provision of section 34-44-1-3 of the Indiana Code and its relation to the
Worker’s Compensation Act’s subrogation provision.126 In 2002, Jerry
Jarrells was seriously injured at work, and as a result, his employer’s
compensation carrier, Travelers Indemnity Company of America, paid
him worker’s compensation disability benefits.127 Jarrells brought a
third-party claim against the negligent tortfeasor.128 At the trial, Jarrells
testified that “he might have to reimburse Travelers for [worker’s
compensation] payments.”129 The trial court gave the jury the pattern
“Collateral
Source
Instruction,”
which
stipulated
“[i]n
determining . . . damages, you must consider . . . [p]ayments for worker’s
compensation.”130 The trial court rejected Travelers’ lien, finding the
124
Wershbale, supra note 90, at 352–53. “These states include Alabama, Arizona,
California, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin.” Id.
125
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-3. The statute reads: “Proof of payments under section 2 of
this chapter shall be considered by the trier of fact in arriving at the amount of any award
and shall be considered by the court in reviewing awards that are alleged to be excessive.”
Id.; see Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 377 (applying this statute).
126
Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 376. The trial court denied Travelers’ lien, holding that the
“requested relief would impose a double setoff on the recovery because the jury had
already deducted the worker’s compensation benefits from the gross award.” Id. at 376.
The appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling and entered judgment for Travelers. Id.
The appellate court found that the lien was included in the award amount and was owed to
the carrier. Id.
127
Id. at 375. The disability payments paid by Travelers to Jarrells consisted of $21,025.91
in disability benefits and $45,109.76 in medical payments, for a total of $66,135.67. Id.
128
Id. Jarrells notified Travelers of the third-party action, Travelers informed Jarrells of
its lien rights in the amount of $66,135.67, but chose not to intervene. Id.
129
Id. at 376; see id. at 375–76 (stipulating that “Jarrells presented evidence of the worker’s
compensation payments” and acknowledged that “he might have to reimburse Travelers”).
130
Id. at 377. The pattern “Collateral Source Instruction” used in this case provided the
following:
If you find that Jerry Jarrells is entitled to recover, you shall consider
evidence of payment made by some collateral source to compensate
Jarrells for damages resulting from the accident in question. In
determining the amount of Jarrells’ damages, you must consider the
following type of collateral source payments:
Payments for worker’s compensation.
In determining the amount received by Jarrells from collateral sources,
you may consider any amount Jarrells is required to repay to a
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award had been set-off already, but the court of appeals reversed, with
the Indiana Supreme Court granting a transfer.131
The central issue concerned the allocation of damages, specifically
whether the jury deducted the amount of worker’s compensation
benefits that Jarrells received from the total damages figure.132 The court
held that the carrier was not entitled to a statutorily enumerated lien
even though the collateral source instruction required the jury to
“consider” whether the worker was required to repay any of the
collateral source benefits received.133 The court reasoned that directing
the jury to “consider” the benefits makes the instruction less than clear as
to how the jury will consider the payments.134 The court conceded the
possibility that the jury had included the amount, but found that this
conclusion was “less likely,” instead deferring to the trial court to infer
the jury’s intent.135 The court further considered lien complexity as a
reason the jury may not have deducted the benefits.136 Uncertainty as to
damage allocation has become so paramount that the U.S. Supreme

collateral source and the cost to Jarrells of collateral benefits received.
Jarrells may not recover more than once for any item of loss sustained.
Id.
Id. at 376. After Jarrells notified Travelers of his subsequent judgment, he refused to
reimburse its worker’s compensation lien, claiming the “jury already reduced the award by
the amount of the work[ers’] comp[ensation] benefits and the award should not be reduced
further after judgment.” Id.
132
Id. at 377. The court explained that the purpose of the statute—to prevent double
recovery—assumes that the jury would award a lessor amount after “considering” the
worker’s compensation benefits. Id.
133
Id. at 378–79.
134
Id. at 378. The court found:
The jury could have interpreted this instruction in at least two ways.
The trial court concluded that the jury deducted the amount of
worker’s compensation payments from the amount of Jarrells’
damages in order to prevent Jarrells from “recover[ing] more than
once for any item of loss sustained.” The Court of Appeals found that
the amount of worker’s compensation payments should be included in
the jury’s value of damages to permit Jarrells to fulfill the obligation to
repay.
Id. (alteration in original).
135
Id. at 378–79; see id. at 379 (‘“[T]he trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the
evidence and assess whether the jury’s verdict is rationally based’ in determining whether
the jury verdict was excessive.” (quoting Murry v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 153 (3d
Cir. 1979)). The stated purpose of the Collateral Source Act, as “emphasized to the jury,” is
to prevent double recovery by the injured party; therefore, the court reasoned it was
“plausible” that the jury deducted the amount. Id. at 379.
136
Id. The court explained that the calculation of Travelers’ lien was complex and
without an instruction to the jury on how to calculate it, the jury could not have
determined an amount of set-off. Id.
131
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Court recently recognized the risks and recommended methods to
minimize potential problems.137
2.

U.S. Supreme Court’s Recognition of the Risks

The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of uncertain damage
allocation and the risk of settlement manipulation in Arkansas Department
of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn.138 The Court indicated that states
should mandate a post-settlement agreement detailing how the award is
stipulated to prevent uncertainty as to collateral source payment
allocation in a jury award.139 Although unwilling to express a view on
the matter, the Court left “open the possibility that such rules and
procedures might be employed to meet concerns about settlement
manipulation.”140
The introduction of collateral source evidence in worker’s
compensation cases leaves courts confused as to damage allocation
because there is not a concrete standard for evidence consideration
where subrogation liens are at stake.141 To eliminate this confusion,
some states have found the introduction of collateral source evidence
inadmissible.142 The U.S. Supreme Court has advised that when such
137
See infra Part II.D.2 (explaining the Supreme Court’s decision addressing collateral
source payment evidence).
138
547 U.S. 268, 288 (2006). The Court explained:
Even in the absence of such a postsettlement agreement, though, the
risk that parties to a tort suit will allocate away the [s]tate’s interest can
be avoided either by obtaining the [s]tate’s advance agreement to an
allocation or, if necessary, by submitting the matter to a court for
decision. For just as there are risks in underestimating the value of
readily calculable damages in settlement negotiations, so also is there a
countervailing concern that a rule of absolute priority might preclude
settlement in a large number of cases, and be unfair to the recipient in
others.
Id. (footnote omitted).
139
Id. The Court explained that another option besides a post-settlement stipulation is
having the court dictate the interest or obtaining an advance agreement. Id. The Court
further explained that some states that have such special rules and procedures have been
successful at preventing confusion as to the allocation of a damages award. Id. at 288 n.18.
140
Id.
141
See supra Part II.D.1 (describing the Indiana Supreme Court’s uncertainty as to the
jury’s intent in the Travelers decision); see also supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text
(describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s recommendation that to avoid such uncertainty,
procedures should be put in place that the jury can definitively follow); infra Part III.A
(describing how the court in Travelers was unable to definitively ascertain the meaning of
“consider” in the Collateral Source Statute, so there was uncertainty as to the jury’s intent
in the damage allocation).
142
For examples of states holding evidence of collateral payments inadmissible, see El
Paso Field Servs. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lopez, No. 01-07-00999-CV, 2010 WL 2133885, at *5 (Tex.
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evidence is introduced, guidelines must be in place to protect against
ambiguity and uncertainty.143 However, as Indiana’s Collateral Source
Statute is presently written, uncertainty as to damage allocation is
inevitable.144 Part III addresses these problems.145
III. INDIANA’S COLLATERAL SOURCE STATUTE MUST BE REVISED TO
PROTECT CARRIERS’ STATUTORILY ENUMERATED SUBROGATION RIGHTS
This Part’s purpose is to demonstrate that Indiana’s Collateral
Source Statute needs to be revised for three reasons.146 First, worker’s
compensation carriers risk losing their statutorily enumerated liens on
damage awards when the Collateral Source Statute is applied in thirdparty actions.147 Second, the ambiguous language of the Collateral
Source Statute risks confusing the jury as to which party bears the
burden of proof regarding the allocation of damages.148 Finally, as
written, the Collateral Source Statute contradicts its own purpose by
allowing double recovery by injured parties and promotes frivolous
litigation.149

Ct. App. May 27, 2010); Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 582 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992);
Polito v. Holland, 365 S.E.2d 273, 275 (Ga. 1988).
143
See supra Part.II.D.2 (suggesting that guidelines should be set for guidance to the jury
and to prevent fraudulent settlements or damage allocation uncertainty).
144
See infra Part III (explaining the problems facing and arguments for changing
Indiana’s Collateral Source Statute).
145
See infra Part III (discussing the problems with the recent interpretation of the
Collateral Source Statute and the Collateral Source Statute itself).
146
See infra Part III.B (describing the three problems encountered when the Collateral
Source Statute is applied in worker’s compensation lien rights actions).
147
See Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Ind. 2010) (explaining
that under the Collateral Source rule, the employer’s worker’s compensation carrier was
not entitled to its statutorily enumerated lien on the third-party judgment); see also Calvin
R. Wright, Note, The Collateral Source Rule in Georgia: A New Method of Equal Protection
Analysis Brings a Return to the Old Common Law Rule, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 835, 843–44 (1992)
(explaining that most state legislatures that have abolished the collateral source rule still
apply it when subrogation rights are at stake as a protection of those rights).
148
See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-3 (West 2011) (stipulating that such evidence “shall be
considered by the trier of fact”). The Indiana Supreme Court found the term “consider”
from the statute’s language to be ambiguous. Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 378. They were
unable to determine what threshold of evidence was required to meet the “considered”
requirement of the statute. Id. The court further explained that the jury instruction
“directing the jury to consider the worker’s compensation benefits . . . is less than clear how
the jury is to take these payments into consideration.” Id.
149
See Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 802 (explaining that the purpose of the Collateral
Source Statute is to prevent double recovery); see also Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 377–78
(stipulating that if Travelers had participated in the trial and provided clarity its lien would
have been protected).
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To fully comprehend the need to revise the Collateral Source Statute,
it is imperative to understand the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in
Travelers.150 The court for the first time applied the Collateral Source
Statute in determining a worker’s compensation carrier’s lien rights in a
third-party action.151 Thus, Part III.A explains that the root cause of the
subrogation issue in Indiana is the ambiguity in the state’s partially
abrogated collateral source rule and the subsequent application of the
rule in the Travelers decision.152 Part III.B explains how the current
Collateral Source Statute hinders effective litigation and resolution of
worker’s compensation disputes.153 Finally, this Part explains that the
Collateral Source Statute’s most recent interpretation undermines longstanding precedent and the Statute’s own stated purpose.154
A. Subrogation Rights Upheaval Catalyst
On May 27, 2010, the Indiana Supreme Court set groundbreaking
precedent with its refusal to uphold a worker’s compensation carrier’s
statutorily enumerated post-judgment lien in Travelers Indemnity Co. of
America v. Jarrells.155 For the first time in Indiana history, the court used
the Collateral Source Statute as the basis for denying a carrier’s lien
rights.156 The imposition of the Collateral Source Statute in this way
indicates what could become an extremely costly trend.
The Travelers decision is a strong indicator of the future of worker’s
compensation in Indiana and is indicative of what could become a

150
See supra Part II.D.1 (detailing the application of the Collateral Source Act for the first
time in a worker’s compensation context in the Travelers decision). But see Shirley v.
Russell, 663 N.E.2d 532, 536 (Ind. 1996) (refusing to admit evidence of collateral annuity
payments in a wrongful death claim); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gardner, 874 N.E.2d 357, 375
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (refusing to utilize the Collateral Source Act in similar worker’s
compensation third-party actions). Similarly, lien holders are not required to intervene
because the lien is automatically applied. Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., v. Nat’l Emp. Care
Sys., Inc., 469 F.3d 654, 661 (7th Cir. 2006).
151
Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 377.
152
See infra Part III.B (explaining that the ambiguity leaves the courts and the interested
parties with little to no direction on how it should be applied in such situations, and the
effect on the liens when applied).
153
See infra Part III.B (describing the three problems found in the Collateral Source Rule).
154
See infra Part III.B (stipulating there are three main problems caused by the Travelers
decision); see also supra note 123 (showing Indiana’s Collateral Source Statute’s language).
155
See supra Part II.D.1 (discussing the Travelers decision and the court’s analysis); see also
Kellie M. Barr & Marisol Sanchez, Appellate Civil Case Law Update, RES GESTAE, Sept. 2010, at
27, 30 (explaining the significance of the decision in Indiana).
156
See generally Brief of Appellant, Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, No. 29A020807-CV-669 (Ind. Ct. App. Ct. Nov. 7, 2008), 2008 WL 5150592 (arguing that throughout
Indiana’s history, intervention has not been required, and lien rights are automatic).
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national trend.157
Tort reform aimed at collateral source rule
abolishment has become nationally prevalent over the last twenty-five
years.158 The importance of tort reform is compounded due to worker’s
compensation’s effect on the economy, which makes the Travelers
decision all the more significant to Indiana employers and employees.159
This is especially true as our nation struggles to pull itself out of a
crippling recession.160
Employers are required to pay worker’s compensation insurance
costs in Indiana.161 This cost is increasing rapidly as more employees are
filing frivolous claims to ensure job security in the present unstable
economy.162 Worker’s compensation carriers’ costs have increased in
Indiana in the wake of lower demand for their product, lower profits,
and higher claims.163 Since employers are legally precluded from

157
See Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 N.E.2d 374, 379 (Ind. 2010) (holding
that the carrier should have intervened to protect its subrogation right). The court
explained that if Travelers would have intervened, it would have “warrant[ed] a new
trial.” Id. at 377. Stipulating further that “a post-trial intervenor, takes the trial as it finds
it.” Id. Many courts will put the insurer’s interests first, “reasoning that ‘when the
statutory language is unambiguous . . . we will not modify or extend the statute.’” Ingram,
supra note 62, at 115 (quoting McCarter v. Alaska Nat’l Ins. Co., 883 P.2d 986, 990 (Alaska
1994)). Further, many courts, when the subrogation provisions are clear, reject the
suggestion that equitable principles should apply, refusing to mandate that the insured
have first priority. Id.
158
See supra note 105 and accompanying text (describing the reasons advanced by tort
reform proponents); supra note 106 (explaining the primary argument for tort reform is that
third-party collateral sources offset any windfall risks).
159
See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text (describing the effect worker’s
compensation has on the economy’s ability to recover from a recession). Currently, costs
for worker’s compensation premiums are rising as fraud claims increase and demand for
carriers decreases, this in turn means higher premiums and thus costs for employers.
Ceniceros, supra note 54, at 1–2.
160
Id. Fraudulent claims became a startling problem at the decline of the economy in
2009, as workers tried to attain job security through the states’ worker’s compensation
systems. Id.
161
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-13 (West 2005). The amount of money paid out in disability
payments is dependant on the type of injury the employee suffers. JAMES W. HUNT &
PATRICIA K. STRONGIN, THE LAW OF THE WORKPLACE: RIGHTS OF EMPLOYERS AND
EMPLOYEES 115 (1994). The amount of money paid is usually a “percentage of the worker’s
pre-disability average wages, . . . with limits on the minimum and maximum amount that
can be received.” Id.
162
See Hogler, supra note 28, at 85 (explaining that employers pass some of the costs of
worker’s compensation on to their employees through lower wages and reduced hiring);
see generally Ceniceros, supra note 54, at 12 (describing how carriers are facing a hike in
fraudulent claims due to the pressures of an unstable economy).
163
See Hogler, supra note 28, at 85 (explaining that the employer must pass on the costs
for worker’s compensation to consumers of its products); see also Klingel, supra note 58
(explaining that worker’s compensation claim frequency continued to decline in 2009 due
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deducting worker’s compensation costs from employees’ pay, the
increased costs of worker’s compensation claims must be transferred to
consumers.164 Higher prices for goods and services during a recession
only hinder the economy’s ability to rebound.
Both increased claims and additional litigation requirements increase
costs for employers.165 The disability payments paid by an employer can
be recouped through states’ subrogation statutes.166 This function,
however, is severely limited when the carrier’s lien rights are no longer
The paramount holding in Travelers
automatically protected.167
mandates carrier intervention to protect those rights.168 The Collateral
Source Statute in Indiana is meant to contain costs for all parties
involved.169 The collateral source rule was abrogated in response to the
tort reform movement to protect employers and prevent double recovery
by the plaintiff.170 The Travelers outcome contradicts the purpose of the
subrogation and collateral source statutes and dramatically increases

to a tightened job market over the last few years). Although the number of claims declined,
the number of fraudulent claims increased. Id.
164
Hogler, supra note 28, at 85. Until the economy significantly improves, businesses will
be in a precarious position. Klingel, supra note 58.
165
See Wershbale, supra note 90, at 346 (explaining that as the recession lingers, premium
costs remain high and litigation costs are on the rise). Higher litigation costs can only hurt
employers, not help them during a looming recession.
166
See WICKERT, supra note 27, at 31 (describing each state’s subrogation statute and
respective intervention requirements, if any).
167
See supra notes 64–66 (describing the hindrance on litigation when attaining lien
rights); see also Wershbale, supra note 90, at 346 (explaining that the reason subrogation
rights are unenforced is due to the costs associated with attaining them).
168
See supra notes 126–34 and accompanying text (detailing the court’s decision
indicating intervention may be required). In Travelers, the court stipulated that “[i]f
Travelers had participated in the trial and objected to the instruction, this ambiguity [in the
statute’s language] would warrant a new trial.” Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927
N.E.2d 374, 377 (Ind. 2010). The court further found that as a post-judgment intervenor,
Travelers was bound to all prior orders and rulings of the case. Id. at 379.
169
CSX Transp., Inc., v. Gardner, 874 N.E.2d 357, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The court
explained that the Collateral Source Act is meant to keep the injured party from receiving a
windfall, thus reducing the costs involved. Id; see supra notes 106, 158 and accompanying
text (describing the main reason for the tort reform movement, and that the abrogation of
the Collateral Source Act is to reduce costs).
170
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-1–3 (West 2011). Indiana, like most other states, has
abrogated its collateral source rule in response to the widespread tort reform movement;
however, unlike most states, through the use of vague language, Indiana’s statute fails to
ascertain how evidence of collateral source payments should be presented to the fact finder
and why such evidence should be considered. See id. Proponents of tort reform argue that
it will both decrease insurance premiums and frivolous lawsuits. Wershbale, supra note 90,
at 346. However, as the Supreme Court indicated in Arkansas Department of Health &
Human Services, the uncertainty of damage allocation can promote settlement manipulation.
547 U.S. 268, 288 (2006).
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litigation costs, hindering judicial efficiency.171 This result appears to
undermine the purpose of the statute by imposing the burden of proof
solely on the carriers.
Proponents of tort reform argue that abolishing the collateral source
rule will alleviate costs by eliminating plaintiff windfalls and reducing
the cost of frivolous litigation.172 Nonetheless, as seen in Travelers, the
collateral source rule has the reverse outcome in the worker’s
compensation context.173 In Travelers, the plaintiff arguably got exactly
what reform advocates wish to eliminate—a double recovery.174 This
decision has also opened the doors to a landslide of unnecessary judicial
litigation and increased business costs.175
The purpose of the Indiana subrogation statute is to prevent double
recovery by plaintiffs while protecting the employer.176 Before the
Travelers decision, courts interpreting Indiana law held that if an injured
party agreed to receive benefits from a worker’s compensation carrier,
that carrier would have a lien upon any settlement award.177 This is in
furtherance of the long held belief that the employer or its carrier should
be fully indemnified and protected.178 The Travelers decision does not

171
Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 379. But see Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., v. Nat’l Emp. Care
Sys., Inc., 469 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that intervention is not needed for
protection of the lien because to hold otherwise would contradict the purpose of the
statute).
172
See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text (providing the reasons for the tort
reform movement).
173
Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 377–79. The court held for Jarrells because there was
uncertainty as to the damage allocation. Id. As indicated by the U.S. Supreme Court,
damage allocation uncertainty leads to manipulation by the injured party and the thirdparty tortfeasor. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 547 U.S. at 288.
174
See supra notes 132–36 and accompanying text (detailing how the court could not
ascertain the jury’s intent as to the allocation of damages, and concluding that it is possible
the plaintiff already received the amount in its award).
175
See infra note 187 and accompanying text (explaining that intervention will be
required to clear up any allocation uncertainty). Pursuant to the decision and the
ambiguity of the statute, as recognized by the court, it is clear that carriers will be required
to intervene to preserve their lien rights. Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 379.
176
See supra note 74 (citing several Indiana cases that have held a main purpose behind
the statute is to prevent double recovery); see also supra note 76 and accompanying text
(explaining that the statute is not to be construed as a protection for the negligent party, but
rather one for the employer/carrier).
177
For examples of pre-Travelers decisions, see Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., v. Nat’l
Emp. Care Sys., Inc., 469 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2006); Smith v. Gary Pub. Transp. Corp., 893
N.E.2d 1137, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Mileff, 520 N.E.2d 123, 128 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988); Freel v. Foster Forbes Glass Co., 449 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
178
Schneider, 469 F.3d at 660. Where the injured employee is successful in its action, the
carriers are entitled to a lien without question. Id. The court further stated that to accept
the argument that intervention is needed “would obliterate a central purpose of the statute,

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss4/6

Kauther: Indiana's Collateral Source Act: Confusing Courts and Underminin

2012]

Collateral Source Act

1167

follow stare decisis and contravenes the purpose of worker’s
compensation by denying the carrier’s lien rights.179 The Indiana
Supreme Court explained that when determining a damage award, the
jury “may consider” worker’s compensation payments.180 The court held
that the parties had not presented enough evidence demonstrating a
requirement to pay collateral source payments, and it was unable to
determine if the payments had been considered by the jury as mandated
by statute.181 Instead, the court attempted to interpret the meaning of the
statute’s uncertain language and found it more “plausible” that the
payments were “considered” and deducted from the award by the
jury.182
The Collateral Source Statute’s failure to allocate the burden of
evidence left the Travelers court to infer the jury’s intent during award
compilation.183 Although the court had emphasized to the jury that the
point of the collateral source rule was to prevent double recovery, its
ruling made double recovery possible, if not probable.184 During trial,
the plaintiff made clear that he would have to repay the payments and
introduced evidence of the amount owed; however, the court still found
it more “plausible” that the jury had deducted the amount previously
from the award.185 This ruling runs contrary to the subrogation statute,
which explicitly requires a repayment of any worker’s compensation
payments in a third-party action.186
which is to establish and protect the reimbursement rights of worker’s compensation.” Id.
659–60.
179
See supra note 85 (listing four Indiana cases that upheld subrogation rights). The
Indiana Supreme Court has also held that applying the subrogation in a way that protects
the carriers’ rights helps to rightly hold the negligent party liable for all the damages it has
caused. N. Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Milhiser, 106 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 1952).
180
See Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 377 (Ind. 2010) (referencing the pattern jury instruction
given that instructed “you may consider any amount Jarrells is required to repay”).
181
Id. at 378. The court found that “by directing the jury to ‘consider’ the worker’s
compensation benefits paid and also to ‘consider’ the obligation to repay, the instruction is
less than clear how the jury is to take these payments into consideration.” Id.
182
Id. at 378–79. Although unable to determine what the jury actually intended, the court
found it more “plausible” that the trial court would be able to ascertain the jury’s intent
than the appellate court. Id. Essentially, the court was advancing the policy of making the
injured party whole over the stated purpose of the statute—to protect against double
recovery. Id.
183
See supra notes 134–36 (describing the court’s attempt to decipher the jury’s intent and
allocation of damages).
184
See supra notes 121, 132 and accompanying text (explaining the court’s explanation
that the statute’s purpose was to prevent double recovery).
185
See supra note 129 and accompanying text (detailing how the injured party during trial
informed the jury of his obligation to repay the worker’s compensation benefits).
186
See supra note 84 and accompanying text (noting that the court explained that the
Indiana subrogation statute specifically says, “from the amount received by the employee
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This revolutionary interpretation by the Travelers court means that to
protect their lien rights, and to contain costs, carriers will need to
intervene in all third-party actions brought by injured workers.187 This
contradicts the subrogation statute, which mandates that from any
settlement or judgment, the carrier or employer shall receive “the
amount of compensation paid to the employee or dependents.”188
The subrogation statute subjects any recovery to set-off for the
employer’s pro-rata share of the expenses incurred in the injured party’s
action.189 It is contradictory to off-set the pro-rata share of expenses from
the employer’s lien while at the same time requiring that the carrier
assure enough evidence is presented to reserve its rights.190 Not only
would intervention be contradictory, but also extremely inefficient.191 As
the U.S. Supreme Court indicated in Alhorn, a good solution is to set up
policies and procedures that outline the allocation of damages.192 By

or dependent there shall be paid to the employer or the . . . carrier . . . amount of
compensation paid to the employee” (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-13 (West 2005))).
187
Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 379. Carriers only hope that the courts will interpret the
“consider” language in the Collateral Source Statute in their favor is to intervene and argue
their case in every third-party case brought by an injured employee. See, e.g., id.
188
§ 22-3-2-13; see supra notes 74–76, 79, 82–85 (describing the purpose of Indiana’s
subrogation statute); see also Gary L. Wickert, The Many Faces of Workers’ Compensation
Subrogation, FINDLAW, http://library.findlaw.com/2006/Jul/7/246725.html (last visited
Apr. 29, 2012) (“Indiana’s [subrogation] statute is “fairly straightforward . . . . [A]ny
amount recovered . . . shall be paid to the employer/carrier in satisfaction of
[their] . . . subrogation interest.”).
189
§ 22-3-2-13. The code specifically states that any lien repaid is “subject to [the carrier]
paying its pro-rata share of the reasonable and necessary costs and expenses of asserting
the third party claim.” Id. Courts have held that even if the pro-rata share is not paid until
the end, the lien is not waived. E.g., Welter v. F.A. Wilhelm Constr., 743 N.E.2d 1255, 1259
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
190
See Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., v. Nat’l Emp. Care Sys., Inc., 469 F.3d 654, 658–59
(7th Cir. 2006); Welter, 743 N.E.2d at 1259 (finding nothing had to be done before the lien
should be repaid, holding the carriers’ liens are automatic). Establishing an evidence
threshold nullifies the pro-rata share set-off of the subrogation statute. Schneider, 469 F.3d
at 659–60.
191
See State v. Mileff, 520 N.E.2d 123, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (stipulating that the
employer’s rights are what is supposed to be protected). The court held that the employee,
pursuant to the statute, is made the employer’s trustee, and that the employee is
responsible for securing the lien rights for the employer. Id. By holding that the injured
party is the carrier’s “trustee,” the courts have placed them with the burden of establishing
the lien. Id. It would be an unnecessary waste of judicial resources and litigation expense
to require the carrier to do the same thing that the injured party should already be doing.
Id.
192
See Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 288 (2006)
(explaining that failing to allocate leads to settlement manipulation). The Court stipulated
that states that have set up “special rules and procedures” for proceeds have circumvented
such problems. Id. at 288 n.18.
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clarifying the language of the statute to mandate damages, the issues
from the statute’s ambiguity would be eliminated.
B. Collateral Source Statutes’ Ambiguity and Travelers Detrimental
Interpretation
Through the use of vague language and lack of burden allocation,
the Collateral Source Statute leaves courts guessing as to its meaning, as
demonstrated in the Travelers decision.193 The Travelers court interpreted
the statute’s language, specifically the “consider[ation]” of evidence, to
mean a carrier must meet an uncertain evidence standard.194 This
burdens the judiciary, the subrogation statue, and the economy. This
decision has thus caused three problems: (1) it undercuts the purpose of
worker’s compensation and the subrogation statute; (2) the ambiguous
language of the Collateral Source Statute allows for uncertain guess
work and unpredictability in the allocation of damage awards; and (3)
the Collateral Source Statute’s interpretation in Travelers undermines the
collateral source rule’s purpose.195
1.

Indiana’s Collateral Source Statute as Interpreted in Travelers
Undermines Indiana’s Worker’s Compensation System

One of the main purposes of Indiana’s Worker’s Compensation Act
is to reduce litigation costs.196 However, the Indiana Supreme Court in
Travelers ignored stare decisis and concluded that the jury more likely
protected the plaintiff’s interests, ignoring the stated purpose of
protecting against a double recovery.197 This decision emphasizes a
purpose that, although arguably important, is not one of the main
purposes advanced by the state’s worker’s compensation system.198
Almost all Indiana courts before the Travelers decision had upheld
the notion that the employee was essentially the trustee of the
193
See Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 N.E.2d 374, 377–78 (Ind. 2010)
(explaining that the court was uncertain about the jury allocation of damages because of
the Collateral Source Act’s ambiguous language).
194
See supra notes 126–35 and accompanying text (describing the Indiana Supreme
Court’s interpretation of Indiana subrogation law).
195
See infra Part III.B.1–3 (explaining in detail the problems respectively).
196
See supra note 77 and accompanying text (quoting Indiana’s subrogation statute’s
language). “The purpose of the Indiana Worker’s Compensation Act is to avoid
litigation . . . . [S]ections within it evidence a strong policy against allowing a double
recovery.” WICKERT, supra note 27, at 459 (footnotes omitted).
197
See generally Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 379 (finding for the injured party over the
carrier’s lien rights).
198
See supra notes 74–76, 79, 82–85 (describing the main purpose of the subrogation
statute).
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employer’s rights.199 This protection of employers’ interests is justified
for several different reasons. First, the employee receives a benefit from
the faultless employer to compensate for damages resulting from the
incident.200 It is conducive to public policy to reimburse the employer
for an act that it did not contribute in causing.201 Second, the employer,
pursuant to the subrogation statute, must repay its pro-rata share of all
litigation expenses for the third-party action, thus eliminating any risk
that the injured party would be disadvantaged by bringing the claim.202
This long-standing protection is seen in the Schneider decision.203
Reiterating past Indiana court decisions, the Schneider court found that
the purpose of Indiana’s worker’s compensation subrogation statute was
to protect the employer by providing them with compensation without
further litigation.204 Utilizing past Indiana common law, the Schneider
court emphasized two key themes: (1) the subrogation statute is meant
to eliminate unnecessary litigation; and (2) the central purpose is the
protection and reimbursement of the employer.205 The Travelers decision
deviates from the clear purpose of Indiana’s worker’s compensation case
law.206 Although not explicitly saying that intervention is necessary to
199
See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text (holding that the employer’s lien rights
were protected in the third-party actions litigated).
200
Hogler, supra note 28, at 85–88. In every state, under the specific state’s Worker’s
Compensation Act, workers are entitled to collect from their employer’s medical benefits,
regardless of the employer’s fault. Id. The Act sets up procedures and policies with the
purpose of eliminating costly litigation for the employer. Id.
201
See Ingram, supra note 62, at 107–08 (explaining it would be against the purpose of
subrogation to hold a faultless party responsible). The doctrine of subrogation is based on
principles of equity that mandate that the employer be reimbursed for its contribution
when faultless. Id.
202
See supra note 77 and accompanying text (explaining how Indiana is one of the few
states that requires the employer/carrier to pay its fair share of all third-party litigation
expenses).
203
See Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., v. Nat’l Emp. Care Sys., Inc., 469 F.3d 654, 656–58,
660 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that the carrier’s lien rights were not waived because the carrier
did not intervene and finding the settlement between the tortfeasor and the claimant
invalid for failing to obtain the carrier’s consent).
204
See generally id. at 658 (stipulating the twin purposes of the statute were to prevent
double recovery and assure reimbursement).
205
Id.
206
See Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 N.E.2d 374, 379 (Ind. 2010) (refusing to
recognize the carrier’s lien rights); see also supra note 177 and accompanying text (detailing
Indiana cases that have interpreted Indiana worker’s compensation law and upholding lien
rights). The court in Travelers undermines these holdings by putting the injured
employee’s rights first. Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 379. The court itself admits “the possibility
that the jury included the amount of worker’s compensation payments made to Jarrells in
its award based on its assumption that he would have to repay Travelers for those
payments.” Id. at 378. The court goes on to justify its decision by stipulating that this
outcome “is less likely” than the possibility that it was already included in the award. Id.
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protect a lien right, the Travelers court still abolishes any hope of an
efficient solution to a third-party action. A “successful conclusion”
according to past Indiana cases, and their summation in Schneider,
appeared to be one that was quick and efficient, affording the utmost
protection to the employer/carrier liens.207 The court in Travelers aims
for the opposite result, explicitly explaining that the ambiguity, and thus
the lien, would have been granted to the carrier if it had intervened and
clarified the rights for the jury.208 This is contrary to Indiana’s Worker’s
Compensation Act’s purpose and stare decisis, which found the lien rights
automatic under the subrogation statute.209 It was Indiana’s Collateral
Source Statute’s ambiguous language that made this divergent decision
possible.
2.

The Collateral Source Statute in Indiana Is Ambiguous and Unclear

The Indiana Collateral Source Statute uses ambiguous language as to
how payment evidence should be used in determining a damages
award. During the Travelers trial, pursuant to a pattern collateral source
jury instruction, the jury was specifically instructed to consider
repayment of worker’s compensation benefits into its award
calculation.210 The instruction to the jury was based on the statute’s
language, and yet the court still refused to honor the carrier’s lien due to
uncertainty.211
207
Schneider, 469 F.3d at 659; see id. at 661 (upholding the carrier’s lien in accordance with
Indiana law).
208
See supra note 157 (stipulating that the lienholder could have protected its rights by
intervening, so appearing to establish the intervention requirement for lien protection).
209
See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text (noting that all previous Indiana court
precedents have upheld this protection until the drastic change in Travelers, and there was
no explanation in the court’s decision to explain the drastic change from prior precedent).
210
Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 377. The pattern jury instruction given stated:
If you find that Jerry Jarrells is entitled to recover, you shall consider
evidence of payment made by some collateral source to compensate
Jarrells for damages resulting from the accident in question. In
determining the amount of Jarrells’ damages, you must consider the
following type of collateral source payments:

Payments for worker’s compensation.
In determining the amount received by Jarrells from collateral sources,
you may consider any amount Jarrells is required to repay to a
collateral source and the cost to Jarrells of collateral benefits received.
Jarrells may not recover more than once for any item of loss sustained.
Id. (citing INDIANA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL (MICHIE) 11.07 (2d ed.
2007).
211
See supra note 210 (quoting the language of the jury instruction given).
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Providing clarity at trial goes against both active parties’ personal
interests.212 Failing to inform the jury benefits both the injured party and
the tortfeasor.213 This switch in interest protection contradicts the
purpose of worker’s compensation, the tort reform movement, and
subrogation statutes.214 Almost every prior Indiana decision, including
Schneider, explicitly held that carriers are not required to engage in any
sort of litigation to protect their rights; thus, the Travelers decision to
implicitly hold that they are required to provide clarity—by interjecting
into the action itself—is a bad policy and deviates from the purpose of
worker’s compensation.215
The main issue in Travelers was the meaning of the word “consider”
in the Collateral Source Statute.216 The court was correct when it said
“consider” is an ambiguous term because it can take on several different
meanings.217 Both the Collateral Source Statute and the Travelers

212
See supra note 138 (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the risk of
settlement manipulation without clarification).
213
See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text (describing how manipulation is
promoted when the allocation of damages is uncertain).
214
See supra Part II (explaining that a primary purpose of these three areas was to prevent
double recovery).
215
See supra Part III.A (describing how the interpretation of the Collateral Source
Statute’s ambiguous language by the Travelers decision is an “upheaval” of the statute’s
purpose).
216
See Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 N.E.2d 374, 377–78 (Ind. 2010)
(explaining that the jury instruction of the use of the word “consider” could have been
interpreted in two different ways: either allocating the lien amount in the damages award
or not).
217
Id. It is not a definitive standard that a jury can easily work with, as the statute simply
states that “proof of payments . . . shall be considered by the trier of fact in arriving at the
amount of any award.” Id.; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-1 (West 2011). The court explains:
If the jury is to consider evidence of collateral source payments such as
worker’s compensation that the plaintiff is required to repay, the only
plausible interpretation of these provisions is that the jury should
include the amount of any collateral source payments that the plaintiff
is required to repay in its award to the plaintiff. If, however, there is
no evidence of an obligation to repay, then the jury should not include
the amount of collateral source payments in its award. The defendant,
therefore, is benefited by evidence of the collateral source payments,
and the plaintiff gets the benefit of proof of obligation to repay.
Travelers, 927 N.E.2d. at 377.
The holding by the court does not make sense when applied to the facts of
the trial, because at trial there was evidence that a lien would have to be repaid
by Jarrells (the injured party). So evidence was presented, but at no point in its
decision does the court indicate how much evidence should have been
presented, or how to secure the lien.
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decision do little to provide clarity as to how juries should “consider”
these payments in the future.218
If Indiana’s subrogation statute is to operate effectively and
guarantee the lien rights of carriers, as it was intended, the Collateral
There are two proposed
Source Statute must be amended.219
amendments discussed in Part IV, the first of which would reinstate the
common law collateral source rule and remove the abrogation for
worker’s compensation payments.220 This option would eliminate any
possibility that the jury could misuse the information.221 The second
option would adhere to the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent by
mandating that worker’s compensation payments are included in the
damages award.222
IV. CONTRIBUTION
As explained in Part III, Indiana’s Collateral Source Act as presently
written undermines the purpose of the state’s Worker’s Compensation
Subrogation Act.223 The Collateral Source Act is meant to eliminate
double recovery and reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits, yet its
ambiguous language actually encourages them.224 Furthermore, the
Collateral Source Act allows for contradictory interpretations, as seen in
the Travelers decision.225 This Note proposes that to solve these
problems, the Collateral Source Act must be amended in one of two
ways: Either the Act must be amended so that worker’s compensation
payment evidence is no longer considered by the trier of fact, or the Act
must be amended to remove the present ambiguity and mandate that
worker’s compensation liens are included in the damages award. Both
solutions will revive the intention of Indiana’s Worker’s Compensation

218
Id. at 377–78. The court just stipulates that the jury instruction should not be used
again, but nothing in the decision sets out any future standard to be used.
219
See infra Part IV.
220
See infra Part IV (explaining that if the common law collateral source rule was
reapplied to third-party actions, the risk of jury confusion and undermining the
subrogation statute would be eliminated).
221
See infra Part IV (describing how the payment evidence can easily confuse the jury
when introduced).
222
See supra Part II.B.4; see infra Part IV (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s
recommendation—to provide guidelines for juries to follow so uncertainty is removed
from the damage award).
223
See supra Part III (explaining that the purpose of the Collateral Source Act is to prevent
against double recovery, yet the most recent interpretation allows for just that).
224
See supra Part III (detailing arguments in support of collateral source rule revision).
225
See supra Part II.D (describing various jurisdictions approach to abrogation of the
collateral source rule and its impact on carrier subrogation rights).
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Subrogation Act and reflect the Collateral Source Act’s original purpose
of eliminating double recovery.
A. Proposed Amendment to Section 34-44-1-2 of the Indiana Code
The first proposal is to amend the Collateral Source Act to exclude
worker’s compensation payments entirely. This would remove the
present abrogation and revive the common law collateral source rule for
The
the consideration of worker’s compensation payments.226
amendment would prevent the admittance of any payment evidence
related to worker’s compensation payments, thus eliminating the need
for the court to try to determine the jury’s assessment of such
evidence.227 The proposed amended statute follows, with the Author’s
commentary intertwined:
Proposed Amendment to Indiana Code Section 34-44-1-2:
In a personal injury or wrongful death action, the court
shall allow the admission into evidence of:
(1) proof of collateral source payments other than:
(A) payments of life insurance or other death
benefits;
(B) payments of worker’s compensation benefits;
(C) insurance benefits that the plaintiff or members
of the plaintiff’s family have paid for directly; or
(C) payments made by:
(i) the state or the United States; or
(ii) any agency, instrumentality, or subdivision
of the state or the United States;
That have been made before trial to a plaintiff as
compensation for the loss or injury for which the action
is brought;
(2) proof of the amount of money that the plaintiff is
required to repay, including excluding worker’s
compensation benefits, as a result of the collateral
benefits received; and

226
See supra Part II.D.1 (explaining the common law collateral source rule and its bar on
the introduction of third-party payments for injuries incurred).
227
See supra Part II.D (discussing the courts’ uncertainty in determining the jury’s intent
as to the allocation of the damages award).
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(3) proof of the cost to the plaintiff or to members of the
plaintiff’s family of collateral benefits received by the
plaintiff or the plaintiff’s family.228
Commentary
This proposed amendment to section 34-44-1-2 of the Indiana Code
makes the necessary changes to: 1) avoid uncertainty as to the jury’s
consideration of worker’s compensation payment evidence; 2) eliminate
any requirement to intervene in third-party actions to guarantee rights
for carriers; and 3) revitalize the purpose of Indiana’s subrogation statute
by once again protecting the worker’s compensation carrier’s lien rights.
First, as explained previously, the main issue in Travelers was the
court’s admitted inability to determine how the jury considered the lien
repayment evidence presented at trial.229 This proposed amendment
would remove that uncertainty and eliminate any unnecessary burden
on the jury. Under this approach, the jury would not be weighed down
with the complications of worker’s compensation law or the complexity
of a carrier’s lien—it would not even consider these issues.230
Second, the elimination of the evidence requirement will make
carrier intervention to guarantee rights unnecessary. Due to the illogical
precedent set by the Travelers decision and its contravention of worker’s
compensation’s purpose, carriers currently have no guarantee that their
liens will be protected without costly intervention.231 This is because no
clear standard for lien preservation has been set by the Collateral Source
Act or the Indiana Supreme Court.232 By eliminating the need for the
presentation of worker’s compensation benefit repayment evidence, the
burden on the interested parties, the court system, and the economy will
be lifted. Restoration of the common law rule in this area will prevent
courts from setting evidentiary standards or thresholds, make claim
outcomes more predictable, dramatically reduce litigation expenses,
restore judicial efficiency, and save time. Most importantly, the

The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the Author.
See supra Part II.D.1 (describing Indiana’s approach to collateral source rule
abrogation in worker’s compensation cases).
230
See supra Part II.D.1 (explaining that the court reasoned in Travelers that the lien was
not included because of the lien’s complexity).
231
See supra Part II.D.1 (explaining that one of the reasons subrogation is so rare is
because of the complexity of determining the carrier’s lien amount).
232
See supra Part III (demonstrating that the Travelers decision failed to set any standard
to guarantee a lien for the carrier, and the Act’s ambiguous language forecloses the ability
to gage a concrete standard).
228
229
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Collateral Source Act’s purpose of reducing unnecessary litigation and
expense will be realized.233
Third, the restoration of the common law collateral source rule will
restore the purpose of Indiana’s subrogation statute.234 The Act is meant
to eliminate double recovery, like the Collateral Source Act, while
protecting the interests of the carrier.235 It is vital that the carrier’s
interests are protected because such protection affects the state’s overall
economy.236 Employers in Indiana are required to carry worker’s
compensation insurance, and when carriers’ costs increase, such as
through litigation expenses to recover liens, premiums charged to
employer businesses increase.237 Employers in Indiana have already
experienced this hike in premiums, a cost that is most certainly
transferred to consumers.238
B. Proposed Mandate of Worker’s Compensation Liens in Damage Awards
Although the previous recommendation to resort back to the
common law collateral source rule for worker’s compensation payments
is arguably the simpler solution, there is another alternative that will
achieve the same result. The second proposal is that if the Collateral
Source Act is to be reformed at all, it should be rewritten to mandate that
worker’s compensation payments are included in the damages award.
This proposal would still remove all the risky guess work about the
allocation of funds, eliminate the need for carriers to intervene to
preserve their rights, and lower business and litigation costs, while
preserving judicial efficiency. Revision of Indiana’s Collateral Source
Act section 34-44-2-3 follows:
In arriving at the amount of any award the trier of fact:
(1) must include in the award any payments that the
plaintiff is statutorily required to repay to any third-parties;
and

233
See supra Part II.D (describing the purposes behind Indiana’s Collateral Source Statute,
which includes prevention against double recovery).
234
See infra Part IV.A (describing how the common law collateral source rule will clear up
any discrepancies in award allocation).
235
See supra Part II.B (detailing how the subrogation statute is meant to protect the
carrier’s interests and alleviate costs).
236
See supra Part II.A (explaining that worker’s compensation insurance, as a multibillion dollar industry, is the largest insurance line in the nation).
237
See supra notes 55–58, 161–64 and accompanying text (explaining the negative effect
the increased claims have had on the economy during the recession).
238
See supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text (explaining that with no other way to
recoup the costs, they get transferred to consumers).
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(2) other payment evidence not required to be repaid by
the plaintiff may be considered by the trier of fact in arriving
at the award amount and shall be considered by the court in
reviewing award that are alleged to be excessive.239
Commentary
This second proposed amendment appeals to collateral source rule
reformers, who worry that without evidence of third-party payments,
the plaintiff stands to receive a windfall.240 This option also gives the
jury the “whole picture” as to third-party benefits, allowing them to
make a more informed decision and ensuring a more accurate damage
award. At the same time, this option protects the lien holder’s
subrogation rights by mandating that the payments are included in the
award. Since more evidence must be presented under this proposal, it
may be less judicially efficient, but given that this solution appeals to
both sides of the tort reform movement, it may be worth the additional
time and effort.
V. CONCLUSION
Worker’s compensation insurance is a multi-billion dollar industry
in the United States and, as such, is an integral part of Indiana’s
economy. It is vital to Indiana’s economy that the integrity of the
worker’s compensation system be protected. To ensure such protection,
carriers’ liens must continue to be judicially recognized and enforced.
The Indiana Supreme Court flouted previous case law and undermined
the state’s worker’s compensation system by denying worker’s
compensation carriers statutorily enumerated lien rights in the Travelers
decision. This decision was attributed to the Collateral Source Act’s
ambiguous language, which, as currently written, leaves the door open
for double recovery, a phenomenon the Act was meant to prevent.
The ambiguity in Indiana’s Collateral Source Statute leads to
detrimental results that contradict the statute’s purpose of preventing
double recovery. To restore this purpose, the ambiguity in Indiana’s
Collateral Source Act must be replaced with a concrete standard that
protects all parties’ interests. Either the consideration of worker’s
compensation payments should be prohibited by returning to the
common law collateral source rule for the consideration of such
payments or juries should be mandated to include any lien in the
The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the Author.
See supra Part II.C (describing the recent tort reform movement, which has grown
because of a desire to reduce costs and frivolous lawsuits).
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damages award. Both of these solutions would restore the prevention of
double recovery, promote judicial efficiency by eliminating the implicit
requirement of intervention for lien protection, and reduce business
costs. The concrete standards proposed would guide the courts and
protect the integrity of Indiana’s worker’s compensation system while
helping to revitalize Indiana’s economy, an outcome where everyone
benefits.
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